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The paper investigates the reaction of public R&D spending on economic crises. We are interested in 
two counteracting motives: On the one hand, public R&D spending can be seen as a means to fight the 
crisis, and governments may decide to increase their R&D budgets. On the other hand, a crisis reduces 
public income and urges governments to cut spending, which may negatively affect public R&D 
budgets. Using panel data from 26 OECD countries over the period 1995 to 2015, we investigate how 
public R&D expenditure changes over the business cycle for different types of government R&D 
expenditure. On average, we find evidence for a strong pro-cyclical effect on public R&D investments. 
But country heterogeneity matters. Whereas European innovation leaders and non-EU countries 
pursue a counter-cyclical strategy, innovation followers and moderate innovators behave pro-cyclical. 
This leads to an increasing innovation gap in Europe. Short-run and long-run financing conditions 
(budget surplus and government debt levels) also significantly affect public R&D spending.  However, 
there is no evidence that economic crises systematically affect the composition of public R&D spending 
along different thematic areas or by beneficiaries. 
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R&D is a main driver of long-run economic growth. Short-term adjustments of R&D activities in 
response to an economic crisis may harm the building of knowledge capital stocks and reduce the long-
term positive effects on productivity growth. This is particularly true if R&D projects are stopped before 
completion so that parts of prior investment do not produce knowledge assets. Unbalanced cuts of 
R&D activities during a crisis may also hamper knowledge flows and reduce positive spillover effects 
of R&D. 
Keeping investment into R&D at a high level even if the economic situation is tough should hence be a 
policy priority. Governments may react to an economic crisis in different ways. One reaction is to help 
private firms maintain their level of R&D expenditure by providing (additional) R&D subsidies and other 
forms of direct or indirect R&D support. Another way to keep R&D expenditure high during crisis is to 
extend R&D activities in the public sector (universities, government research labs) to compensate for 
a likely reduction in the private sector.  
Increasing government support for private R&D and expanding public R&D budgets during an 
economic crisis is challenged by a pressure for fiscal consolidation. As economic activities decrease, 
public income from taxes will decrease too, calling for austerity measures. In such a situation, 
governments may opt to focus their R&D spending policy on those targets (both in terms of thematic 
areas and R&D actors) which they feel most urgently need public support or for which they expect the 
most significant macro-economic impact. But governments may also opt to cut R&D budgets in 
response to falling tax income as short-term consequences of such cuts may be less severe for the 
economy compared to other areas such as social security or labour market interventions. Such cuts 
may be easier to realise for discretionary expenditure such as subsidies and more difficult for 
institutional funding of research infrastructures. 
Against this background, the present paper attempts to investigate the following research questions: 
- How do economic crises influence the overall level and growth of public R&D spending?  
- Do economic crises lead to shifts in the composition of public R&D expenditures across different 
thematic areas?  
- Are there any business cycle induced redistributions across different recipients of public R&D 
expenditure? 
In answering these research questions, we put a special focus on the question as well whether 
governments in Europe and in OECD countries outside Europe react differently to the crisis in terms of 
level and composition of public R&D spending. 
We use data on government R&D spending for 26 OECD countries for the period 1995-2015. Employing 
the Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI) database, we distinguish the following categories 
of government R&D spending: 
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- Total public R&D funding broken down by recipients: business enterprise sector, higher education 
sector, government sector 
- Total government appropriations or outlays for R&D, broken down by thematic focus, 
distinguishing defence, health/environment, space, education/society, economic development, 
non-oriented R&D, and general university funds.  
We measure business cycle fluctuations and economic crisis by the most simple measure, the change 
in real GDP. As government R&D spending data are only available on an annual base, we use annual 
change in GDP. In addition, we use different business cycle indicators. Most importantly, an economic 
crisis (recession) marks a year with negative growth in real GDP. We also consider the impact of a 
budget surplus or deficit as well as the level of government debt. Both variables reflect governments’ 
financing conditions but are also highly correlated with the business cycle. 
Our regression results demonstrate four major findings: First, there is strong pro-cyclical effect on 
public R&D investments. An increase in GDP by 1 percent leads to a subsequent increase in public R&D 
spending (GBAORD) by roughly 0.15 to 0.2 percent. Furthermore, the growth rate of GBAORD is 
significantly lower in a recession. There is, however, impressive evidence that countries react 
differently to recessions. In particular, European innovation leaders and non-EU countries pursue a 
counter-cyclical strategy whereas innovation followers and moderate innovators behave pro-cyclical. 
As a result, we have observed an increasing innovation gap between innovation leaders and moderate 
innovators in Europe due to the most recent 2008 crisis. Second, short-run and long-run financing 
conditions (budget surplus and government debt levels) affect public R&D spending significantly. Third, 
economic crises do not systematically affect the composition of GBAORD spending along different 
thematic areas. And finally, there is no evidence for a business cycle induced redistribution of public 
R&D expenditures across recipients. 
In the next section, we briefly discuss the way business cycle fluctuations, and economic crisis in 
particular, may influence governments’ decisions to provide funding for R&D for different economic 
sectors and different purposes. Section 3 describes the data we use and the econometric approach. 
Section 4 presents and discusses our estimation results. Policy conclusions are provided in the final 
section. 
2 Literature Review 
Business cycle impacts on R&D expenditure of firms have been analysed both on a theoretical level 
(see Barlevy 2007, Shleifer 1987, Francois and Lloyd-Ellis 2003, 2009) and in many empirical studies 
(see Geroski and Walters 1995, Fatas 2000, Wälde and Woitek 2004, Comin and Gertler 2006, Rafferty 
and Funk 2008, Bovha-Padilla et al. 2009, Aghion et al. 2010, 2012, Ouyang 2011, Filippetti and 
Archibugi 2011, López-Garcia et al. 2012, Fabrizio and Tsolmon 2014, Arvanitis and Woerter 2014, Hud 
and Rammer 2015, Giebel and Kraft 2015). Most studies find a pro-cyclical behaviour of R&D in firms, 
though opportunity costs may lead to counter-cyclical R&D as costs of (long-term) R&D investment 
compared to (short-term) capital investment costs tend to be lower in recessions and higher in boom 
periods (see Bean 1990, Gali and Hammour 1991, Saint-Paul 1993, Aghion and Saint-Paul 1998).  
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Less emphasis has been given to the analysis of business cycle impacts on public R&D expenditure, 
particularly with reference to government funding for R&D. With the deep financial and economic 
crisis starting in 2007, the attention towards government decisions on R&D budgets has increased 
substantially, however (see European Commission 2011, OECD 2012). A main issue concerns the 
direction of government response. Arguments for a counter-cyclical reaction on the economic crisis 
refer to Keynesian economics which stress the need to stabilize the economy. By increasing 
government spending during recessions, reducing tax burden and shifting budgets towards a deficit 
governments attempt to increase consumption and investment (Romer 1993). In case of R&D, more 
generous R&D tax incentives and additional subsidies for R&D can help firms to maintain their R&D 
investment level (Paunov 2012, Hud and Hussinger 2015) and may facilitate an endogenous economic 
upturn by stimulating the production of demand-generating innovations during a crisis (Hud and 
Rammer 2015). From a neoclassical perspective, the optimal government reaction depends on the 
degree of substitutability in utility between public and private spending (Arreaza et al. 1999, Lane 
2003). If both are substitutes, government spending should behave counter-cyclically whereas in case 
of complementarity, a pro-cyclical pattern would emerge. Empirical studies are inconclusive whether 
public and private R&D are complements or substitutes (David et al 2000), providing little help for 
government decisions. 
A pro-cyclical pattern of government spending on R&D will be reinforced by decreasing tax income of 
governments during a recession, reducing the funds available for additional expenditure (Makkonen 
2013). In case of a pro-cyclical response, government cuts in R&D budgets may not hit all types of R&D 
equally. Kim (2014) argues that funds and programs for basic research may be more likely become 
targets for budgetary cuts given their relatively high uncertainty and long development time. At the 
same time, most basic research is conducted in universities and government labs, based either on 
institutional funding or long-term research projects which limits the potential for short-term cuts in 
R&D expenditure.  
In a descriptive analysis of changes in governments’ R&D budgets after the economic crisis in 2008/09, 
Makkonen (2013) finds that the majority of EU countries showed a pro-cyclical reaction. In most 
countries R&D budgets followed the general trend of decreasing government expenditure. The 
economies of countries with a pro-cyclical reaction tend to be less innovation oriented and show a 
weaker fiscal performance. Among the countries with a counter-cyclical pattern of government R&D 
spending are those that are characterised as innovation leaders in Europe (Germany, Sweden, 
Denmark) though also several less innovation oriented countries followed a counter-cyclical pattern 
(Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece) (Veugelers 2014).  
Izsak et al. (2013) analysed government reactions on the crisis in terms of policy mix and policy 
priorities in the field of R&D and innovation policy. They found a slight movement towards more 
targeted policies. Governments also tried to increase the leverage of public R&D funding on private 
R&D funding. Some countries extended their R&D tax incentives schemes. Another attempt toward 
more efficient use of public money reinforced public-private partnerships, particularly in areas such as 
energy, environment and health. Some other trends such as an increasing focus on the 
commercialisation of research results and the strengthening of links between public and private 
research as well as fostering high-tech entrepreneurship may not be linked to a crisis response but 
rather reflect general trends in R&D and innovation policy. 
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Veugelers (2016) also points to the issue of prioritising additional R&D expenditure in the situation of 
an economic crisis. She found evidence for a focus of public R&D support on firms that are already 
spending substantially on R&D while little priority is given to firms that want to enter R&D. Veugelers 
(2016) argue that such a spending strategy may limit the impacts of additional funding due to 
decreasing private returns on R&D. Hud and Hussinger (2015) investigated the input additionality of 
increased R&D subsidies by the German government during the economic crisis in 2009. They find 
positive effects, but the effects were smaller than in other years. The lower impact of R&D subsidies 
was not caused by the mere expansion of the size of the R&D programmes but rather reflects changes 
in the R&D behaviour of recipients during the crisis.  
In an assessment of research and innovation policy response to the financial and economic crisis 2007-
09, the OECD (2012) concluded that most governments of OECD countries were resilient to the global 
financial crisis with respect to R&D spending. Most countries did not cut their R&D spending in 2009, 
the year of the most severe direct economic impacts of the crisis. Despite this general resilience, there 
have been substantial differences in the actual policy response. Some countries implemented recovery 
policies which mainly supported ongoing innovation policy initiatives, e.g. by extending the volume of 
programmes. Other countries deliberately avoided any change to their programmes and policies in 
order to safeguard continuity and avoid uncertainty among R&D actors about the long-term priorities 
of R&D and innovation policy. In a few countries, the crisis led to new government innovation initiatives 
and projects. Countries that actively tried to support private R&D during the crisis focused on easing 
access to credit and venture capital, adjusted R&D tax incentive schemes, set priorities in thematic 
areas assumed to be of particular importance for a country’s competitiveness and welfare (e.g. health, 
environment), focussed on R&D support for SMEs, or addressed perceived weaknesses of national 
innovation systems (e.g. public-private cooperation). The OECD (2012) identified a number of 
challenges for these policy responses. Timely response was difficult in some countries due to time 
consuming budgeting processes. Providing fund for new initiatives requires time for planning and 
preparation. A lack of “good projects” also limited the implementation of new effective funding 
initiatives in short term. The uptake of policy measures by the private sector was sometimes quite 
restricted due to high uncertainty about the future economic prospects. Public procurement of 
innovation or public R&D contracts were used to limit the need of private co-funding of government 
support.  
3 Data and Methodology 
3.1 Data on Government R&D Expenditures 
For the empirical analysis we need information on government R&D expenditures which we gather 
from two different data sources. Both data sources are available in the most recent MSTI 2015-2 data 
base (OECD 2016). This data base contains information on Government Budget Appropriation and 
Outlays for R&D (GBAORD). GBAORD contains all government R&D spending in central or federal 
government budgets. The main virtue of GBAORD data relates to the fact that it is derived from the 
annual budget and therefore provides consistent, reliable and most up-to-date figures. GBAORD data 
furthermore allows a breakdown of public R&D outlays by socio-economic thematic areas. Admittedly, 
this breakdown is based on the intentions or objectives of the appropriations at the time the funds are 
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committed and may deviate from the actual content of the projects concerned. With respect to the 
thematic areas GBAORD data can be split into defence and civil government R&D outlays. Within the 
latter group, government R&D outlays are broken down into R&D outlays for economic development 
programmes, health and environment, education and social programmes, space programmes, non-
oriented research programmes and general university funds. A flaw of GBAORD data is that it includes 
all R&D outlays in central or federal government budgets but that it potentially neglects public R&D 
expenditures at the regional level. More specifically, provincial or state government R&D outlays are 
only included if their contribution is significant and local public R&D expenditures are excluded. This 
leads to an underestimation of public R&D expenditure that is more severe in countries with 
considerable regional public R&D spending especially at the local level. We create two main dependent 
variables based on GBAORD data. The first variable, GBAORD , is the logarithm of the total level of 
government appropriations and outlays for R&D in country i and year t. The second variable, 
GRGBAORD , denotes the one-year growth rate of government outlays for R&D. In order to 
investigate changes in the composition of public R&D expenditures according to thematic areas over 
the business cycle in section 4.2 and 5.2, we additionally create shares of different GBAORD categories 
in total GBAORD.   
As an alternative measure for government R&D expenditures, we make use of different components 
of gross expenditure for R&D (GERD) as reported by the OECD (2016). Gross expenditure for R&D aims 
at covering all R&D carried out on a national territory in the year concerned. In contrast to GBAORD
, R&D expenditure figures are based on surveys of the units carrying out the R&D and national 
estimates. GERD is broken down by sector of performance into Business Enterprise R&D (BERD), Higher 
Education R&D (HERD), Government R&D (GOVERD) and Private Non-Profit institutions R&D (PNP). It 
is also broken down by sources of funds into financing by private sector, by government, by other 
national sources and by foreign sources. We make use of the finance structure of R&D expenditure by 
performing entities in order to create the variable PubRD  which captures all R&D expenditure 
financed by the government. PubRD  is the sum of BERD financed by governments, GOVERD excluding 
the part which is financed by the private sector and HERD excluding the part which is financed by the 
private sector (in logs). PubRD is more accurate compared to the intention-based GBAORD data but 
only available with some time lag. GRPubRD describes the one-year growth rate of public R&D 
expenditure. In order to analyse whether the structure of beneficiaries of public R&D expenditure 
change over the business cycle (see section 4.3 and 5.3) time, we create the variables BPubRD , 
GVPubRD  and HPubRD . BPubRD  is the share of publicly financed R&D in Business Enterprises in 
total public R&D expenditures. GVPubRD  and HPubRD are defined accordingly. In contrast to 
GBAORD , PubRD cannot be split by thematic areas.  
3.2 Empirical Implementation and Estimation Method  
Given our research questions, our empirical research strategy is based on four different models: 
Model 1: Level of Government R&D Expenditures 
Model 1 is aimed at explaining the level of government financed R&D expenditures of country i in year 
t ( itGovRD ). itGovRD  is either measured using itGBAORD or itPubRD . Since many of the government 
R&D programmes for business enterprises are multi-annual programmes and a large proportion of 
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government intramural expenditure on R&D is spent on R&D personnel that cannot be flexibly 
adjusted, we choose a dynamic specification, i.e. we include the lagged government R&D expenditures 
as one of the main explanatory variables.  
The extent to which governments can finance R&D expenditures is influenced by budgetary 
developments. From a short-run perspective, public investment in R&D is likely to depend on the public 
budget deficit or surplus. An increasing deficit in terms of a GDP ratio means that overall government 
spending has increased relatively. But high deficits limit further (R&D) spending. And in the long-run, 
high levels of public debts exert a strong pressure to consolidate fiscal budgets in general which might 
also lead to cuts in R&D spending. Higher debt levels constrain spending because additional deficits 
are increasingly difficult to implement1 and interest payments consume an increasing share of the 
budgets. Hence, we include the lagged budget surplus in relation to GDP ( 1itSURPLUS −  )2 and the 
lagged government debt level in relation to GDP ( 1itDEBT −  ) as explanatory variables in the model 
specification. Both variables are normalized by GDP to capture the significant differences in country 
size.  Both variables are furthermore lagged in order to alleviate potential endogeneity problems.  
Our main interest is to investigate how the business cycle affects government financed R&D. There 
might be two opposing effects at work. On the one hand, governments have the responsibility for 
spending on other governmental tasks, particularly the social security system or unemployment 
insurance systems. Spending for these governmental tasks is higher during a recession than during 
non-recession periods so that there is a downward pressure on public R&D spending. On the other 
hand, policy might in fact increase R&D spending in a recession to trigger private investment and to 
act as a Keynesian style stabilizing factor.3 In order to investigate how government R&D is impacted by 
the business cycle, we account for lagged GDP (in logs) ( 1itGDP − ). Likewise, we used the lagged value 
to mitigate endogeneity problems. Lagged GDP seems furthermore justified for itGBAORD as 
government budgets are discussed and set the year before the expenses actually occur (Fuest and Licht 
2014).  1β  measures the percentage increase in government financed R&D due to an increase in lagged 
GDP by one percent. We furthermore include the dummy variable 1itRECESSION −  which equals 1 if 
the economy of country i is in a recession in year t (reference category: non-recession). A recession is 
defined as a year in which the country-specific annual GDP growth is negative. In an alternative 
specification, we also allow our three main explanatory variables, 1itGDP − , 1itSURPLUS −  and 1itDEBT −
, to impact government R&D spending differently in recession and non-recession years by including 
interaction terms.4 As a robustness check we first include a full set of business cycle indicators 
1 This argument is reflected in our data by a negative correlation of SURPLUS  and DEBT of about -0.442. 
2 A negative value indicates a budget deficit. 
3 In the 2008/2009 crisis, this policy was pursued by several countries. The Netherlands granted R&D tax 
deductions or Germany substantially increased R&D funding for SME and e-mobility projects (Fuest and Licht 
2014). 
4 Not surprisingly, the budgetary development and hence SURPLUS  and DEBT are highly correlated with 
the business cycle. The annual GDP growth rate is positively correlated with SURPLUS  (0.430) and negatively 
correlated with DEBT (-0.336). Still, multicollinearity doesn’t seem to be a severe issue for estimation as all 
variance inflation factors are below 1.5.  
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,BOOM DOWNTURN and RECESSION with UPTURN being the reference category that is left out. 
An UPTURN is a year in which GDP growth is positive and increasing, a BOOM marks a year in which 
GDP growth is positive and increasing but subsequently decreasing and DOWNTURN characterizes 
years with positive but decreasing GDP growth. As an additional robustness check we define the two-
phase business cycle indicator DOWN which is 1 if GDP growth is positive but declining or negative 
and 0 for UPTURN  and BOOM periods.  
The specification furthermore accounts for the effect of long-term interest rates (in % per annum), 
itIR . Additional control variables in some of the regressions are country group indicators and time 
dummies. The model further allows for unobserved heterogeneity by including country fixed effects 
iα and an idiosyncratic error term itε . Thus, model 1 can be summarized as follows: 
1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5it it t t t t t
i it
GovRD GovRD GDP SURPLUS DEBT RECESSION IR
Controls
γ β β β β β
α ε
− − − − −= + + + + +
+ + +
          (1) 
Information on GDP , SURPLUS , DEBT  and IR is also obtained from OECD. Furthermore note that 
itGBAORD , itPubRD  and GDP are transformed into inflation and Purchasing Power Parities (PPP) 
adjusted values. This implies that they are measured in constant prices and PPP, i.e. in million 2010 
dollars. Data on the country-specific GDP price indices and PPP rates are likewise taken from MSTI data 
base (OECD 2016).  
Due to its dynamic nature, model 1 is estimated using the system GMM approach (Arellano and Bover 
1995, Blundell and Bond 1998 and Bond 2002). The system GMM estimator is based on a joint 
estimation of model 1 in first differences (in order to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity) for which 
we use lagged levels as instruments and in levels for which we use lagged differences as instruments. 
Model 2: Growth Rate of Government R&D Expenditures 
In contrast to model 1 which is formulated in levels of government R&D expenditures, model 2 
specifies the growth rate of itGovRD  ( itGRGovRD ), either measured using itGRGBAORD  or 
itGRPubRD . As state dependence in growth rates turned out to be insignificant, we neglect the lagged 
growth rate of 1itGovRD −  but we allow for unobserved country heterogeneity in the growth rates of 
government R&D expenditures. We furthermore assume that the growth of government R&D 
expenditure depend on the lagged GDP growth, the lagged budget surplus to GDP ratio and the lagged 
debt to GDP ratio. That leads us to the following static fixed effects model (FE) (2):   
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5it t t t t t
i it
GRGovRD GRGDP SURPLUS DEBT RECESSION IR
Controls
β β β β β
α ε
− − − −= + + + +
+ + +
                       (2) 
Model 3 and Model 4: Composition of Government R&D Expenditures 
Model 3 and model 4 focus on how the business cycle impacts the composition of government R&D 
expenditures, either broken down by thematic areas (model 3) or by beneficiaries using itBPubRD , 
itGVPubRD  and itHPubRD  as dependent variables (model 4).  
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Originally, information on government R&D expenditure covers the period 1981 to 2014 ( PubRD ) and 
2015 ( GBAORD ), respectively. However, the data only covers a very limited set of countries for the 
period 1981 to 1994. Particularly for the new member states only data from the mid-1990s onwards is 
available. Furthermore, data on government debt levels are only available from 1995 onwards. Hence, 
we restrict our estimation sample to the period 1995 to 2014 ( PubRD ) and 1995 to 2015 ( GBAORD
). Sample 1 used for GBAORD is an unbalanced panel containing 474 observations from 26 countries. 
The set of countries includes twenty EU countries (Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal 
, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden and the UK)  and six non-EU countries (Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, South 
Korea and the US).  Sample 2 used for PubRD consists of 354 observations from 23 countries with 
Australia, Luxembourg and Sweden missing. 
4 Descriptive Evidence  
This section provides descriptive evidence on the evolution of government financed R&D expenditures 
and their components over time. Given our research questions, we focus especially on their reaction 
to recession periods.  
4.1 Evolution of Government financed R&D expenditure  
Figure 1 and Figure 2 depict the evolution of government appropriations and outlays for R&D and of 
public R&D expenditure over the period 1995 to 2015. Whereas Figure 1 presents the average annual 
growth rates across all countries, Figure 2 shows both indicators in relation to GDP ( /GBAORD GDP  
and /PubRD GDP ). As expected GBAORD figures are slightly below public R&D expenditure (see 
Figure 2 ) as GBAORD focusses mainly on central government expenditures and neglects some 
government outlays for R&D at the regional level. 
The average annual growth rate of government budget appropriations and outlays for R&D amounts 
to 3.86 percent over the period 1995-2015, whereas public R&D expenditure has grown on average by 
3.71 percent per annum.  Between 1995 and 2007 both indicators for government financed R&D 
demonstrate positive and high annual growth rates, mainly varying between 2.5 and 6 percent. This 
growth in government financed R&D is accompanied by a similar growth in GDP. Figure 2 reveals that 
both indicators for government financed R&D expenditures demonstrate a rather stable development 
in relation to GDP between 1995 and 2007, i.e. in the pre-period of the severe 2008 economic crisis. 
The ratios of GBAORD to GDP and Public R&D to GDP mainly vary between 0.6 and 0.65 percent across 
all 26 OECD countries during that period. For the crisis years 2008 and 2009, we observe a strong 
increase to 0.73 percent for the GBAORD to GDP ratio and 0.76 percent for the Public RD to GDP ratio. 
This strong rise cannot only be traced back to the sharp decline in GDP in most countries but is also 
substantially driven by a strong absolute increase in government financed R&D. Actually, the 2008 
average growth rates for GBAORD and Public R&D turned out to the highest over the period under 
consideration, reaching respectively 8.3 and 6.9 percent.  
Average annual growth of government financed R&D has substantially slowed down in the aftermath 
of the economic crisis, i.e. from 2010 onwards, and has even become negative in some of the years. 
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This decline has been much stronger for GBAORD than for Public R&D, especially for the period 2010 
to 2013. Figure 2 reveals that this has led to an increasing gap between GBAORD and Public R&D. This 
gap has substantially widened during the period 2010 to 2014 and both indicators also show a 
diverging trend. Whereas the Public R&D to GDP ratio has further increased from around 0.75 to close 
to 0.80 percent, the average ratio of GBAORD to GDP has slightly fallen below 0.7 again. Part of this 
divergence might be explained by the fact that especially Public R&D figures for 2014 but also for 2013 
and 2012 are still provisional or based on national or OECD estimates. 
Figure 1: Average Annual Growth Rate of GBAORD and Public R&D Expenditure, 1995-2015 
 
Note: Average annual growth rate of GBAORD  and PubRD across all countries. For the country definition, see section 3.2 
Figure 2: GBAORD and Public R&D Expenditure in % of GDP, 1995-2015 
 
Note: Average /GBAORD GDP  and /PubRD GDP across all countries. For the country definition, see section 3.2. 
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Figure 1 and Figure 2 have already shown interesting changes in the crisis years 2008 and 2009 and in 
the post-crises period from 2010 onwards. However, countries have recovered from the economic 
crisis at quite different paces. In order to investigate the impact of the business cycle, it might thus be 
more appropriate to use country-specific business cycle indicators as those we have defined in section 
3.2. Hence, Figure 3 depicts the average annual growth rates of government financed R&D 
expenditures by country-specific business cycle phases. Distinguishing only between upturns and 
downturns, no clear pattern emerges for the two indicators. Whereas GBAORD shows a pro-cyclical 
behaviour in a sense that it grows faster in upturn periods, Public R&D exhibits a counter-cyclical 
movement. Results are consistent and much more pronounced when we compare recession with non-
recession periods. Both GBAORD and Public R&D reveal a strong pro-cyclical development. The average 
annual growth is about 4 percent for both indicators in non-recession periods, but only about 1 percent 
in the recession period for Public R&D and even far below for GBAORD.  
Figure 3: Average Annual Growth Rate of Government Financed R&D Expenditure by Country-
specific Business Cycle Phases, 1995-2015 
Downturn vs Upturn 
 
Recession vs Non-Recession 
 
Note: Average annual growth rate of GBAORD and PubRD across all countries and different business cycle phases over 
the period 1995 to 2015 ( GBAORD ) and 1995 to 2014 ( PubRD ), respectively. For the country definition and definition of 
business cycles, see section 3.2.  
In order to investigate country-specific public responses to economic crises in more detail, Figure 4 
depicts the average annual growth rate of GBAORD and Public R&D by business cycle phase and 
innovation performance. The role and success of past innovation activities might be an important 
factor for governments when deciding on public expenditures for R&D.  For European countries, a 
country’s innovation performance is measured using the ranking of the Innovation Union Scoreboard 
2015 (European Commission, 2015). The Innovation Union Scoreboard classifies EU member states as 
Innovation Leaders, Innovation Followers, Moderate Innovators, or Modest Innovators based on eight 
key innovation related indicators.5  
5 In the 2015 edition, Germany, Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are ranked as Innovation Leaders. Austria, 
Belgium, France, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Slovenia, and the United Kingdom form the group of 
Innovation Followers. Moderate Innovators are the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, 
Poland, Portugal, and Spain. Modest Innovators are Latvia and Romania (European Commission, 2015). We 
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Figure 4: Average Annual Growth Rate of Government Financed R&D Expenditure by Business 
Cycle Phase and Innovation Performance, 1995-2015 
EU: Innovation Leaders 
 
EU: Innovation Followers  
 




Note: A country’s innovation performance is measured using the classification of the Innovation Union Scoreboard.  
Figure 4 reveals intriguing country differences as response to economic crises. This probably reflects 
country-specific developments and strategies pursued. Innovation leaders like Germany, Denmark, 
Finland and Sweden show a strong counter-cyclical behaviour by fostering government financed R&D 
to a much greater extent during recession periods. Whereas GBAORD increases on average by about 
2.5 per cent during non-recession periods, it has grown on average by more than 8 per cent during 
recession periods. In contrast, we see a clear pro-cyclical behaviour of moderate innovators. Countries 
like the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Portugal, and Spain for 
example exhibit positive and high growth rates of government financed R&D during non-recession 
periods. Consistent with a catching-up behaviour, these growth rates have even been higher than for 
innovation leaders.  In recession periods, however, they substantially cut public budgets for R&D. 
GBAORD, for instance, has decreased by about 3 percent. The growth rate of public R&D expenditures 
refrain from presenting results regarding the last group as the number of recession-affected periods is too 
small for inference in this case and both countries are dropped from the estimation due to missing information 
of other variables. 
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is still positive but at a much lower value than in non-recession periods. Though the picture is 
ambiguous for innovation followers whether they behave pro- or counter-cyclical depending on the 
indicator, we can conclude that annual growth rates of GBAORD and Public R&D only slightly differ 
over the business cycle. Although government financed R&D is only one component of total R&D 
expenditure, these figures in isolation support the view that the innovation gap between innovation 
leaders and moderate innovators in Europe has increased due to the most recent 2008 crisis.   
For comparison, Figure 4 additionally depicts average annual growth rates of government financed 
R&D for Non-European countries. We observe a similar counter-cyclical behaviour than for European 
innovation leaders though to a much lesser extent. 
4.2 Government Appropriations and Outlays for R&D (GBAORD) by Thematic Areas  
The second part of the analysis investigates whether recessions affect the composition of the 
government R&D budgets. When budgets change because of a recession, some elements might take 
priority over others. Therefore, we estimate the effect of the recession on the share of each 
component of GBAORD. We distinguish seven components, following the data availability in the MSTI 
database of the OECD: defence, health and environment, space, general university funds, economic 
development, education and social research, non-oriented R&D.  
Figure 5 shows the evolution of the average share of government budgets allocated to each spending 
category between 1981 and 2015 for the weighted total of 35 OECD countries. The data shows some 
clear trends. While the share of government budgets going to general university funds, education and 
social research, and economic development have been stable, economic development and defence 
R&D budgets have steadily declined throughout the years. In contrast, the share of government R&D 
budgets and outlays assigned to non-oriented R&D and health and environment R&D have gained in 
importance. The former has sharply increased from approximately 10% in the 1990s to more than 20% 
in the 2010s; the latter has steadily increased to some 14% of total GBAORD in 2015. 
Figure 6 compares average GBAORD outlays in years marked as recessions to other years. As before, a 
recession year has been defined as a year in real GDP decreases.6 While some interesting patterns 
emerge, differences are limited to percentage point shifts in allocation. The largest difference is to be 
found in defence R&D spending, which shifts from 9% in non-recession periods to 4% during 
recessions. The share of R&D outlays for economic development also drops, though only slightly from 
26% to 24%. The share of space-oriented R&D outlays remains stable, and the other categories receive 
a higher share of funding during a recession. While our analysis does not cover the causes of any such 
shifts, one explanation for these patterns could be that during recessions, private R&D expenditures 
in these fields drop, and public funds are adjusted to compensate.  
 
6 A graph more generally separating upswing/boom periods and downturn/recession periods shows smaller 
differences than those obtained by separating out recessions. 
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Figure 5: Evolution of GBAORD Components across Time 
 
Note: Countries included: EU-28, Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, and United States. 
 
Figure 6: Composition of GBAORD Outlays in Recession versus Non-recession Periods 
 




Figure 7 presents the same data as in Figure 6, but split between two groups of countries: EU member 
states and Non-European OECD countries (Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, Korea, Switzerland, and 
United States).. Note that among EU member states, the share of R&D outlays for General University 
Funds was stable across recession and non-recession periods, and that the difference in the share of 
defence spending is larger among non-EU countries than for the EU. 
Figure 7: Composition of GBAORD Outlays in Recession versus Non-recession Periods, EU versus 
Non-EU Countries  
European countries Non-European countries 
  
 
As public response to crises in terms of public R&D expenditures might also depend on current 
innovative performance, we additionally present graphs by a country’s ranking in the Innovation Union 
Scoreboard 2015 (European Commission, 2015). Figure 8 shows the results of this exercise for three 
groups of countries: Innovation Leaders, Innovation Followers, and Moderate Innovators. There are 
indeed marked differences among them, in that countries classified as Innovation Leaders the 
composition of GBAORD outlays is more stable across crises than countries classified as Innovation 
Followers or Moderate Innovators.  
In the multivariate analyses (see section 5.2) we formalize these trends by estimating the share of 
GBAORD reserved for each category as a function of business cycle indicators (GDP growth and public 
surplus as share of GDP). Constant country-level heterogeneity will be accounted for through fixed 
effects. We additionally control for non-R&D related government expenditures. For robustness we 
estimate the model using a dynamic panel approach (see Appendix).  
The recession effect will be investigated in two ways. First, constant effects will be captured through 
the inclusion of a recession indicator variable. Second, differences in the surplus/R&D spending 
relation will be captured through an interaction of this variable with public surplus.  
14 
 
Figure 8: Composition of GBAORD Outlays in Recession versus Non-recession Periods, by 
Innovation Union Classification  
Innovation Leaders Innovation Followers 
  




4.3 Public R&D Expenditures by Beneficiaries 
Not all government financed R&D is performed by the government and its institutions. Hence, this last 
section presents the split of government financed R&D expenditures by beneficiaries and its evolution 
over time. In 1995, about 47.7 percent of public R&D was spent to finance expenditure on R&D in the 
higher education sector (HERD). 15.2 percent of public R&D was aimed at supporting R&D performed 
in the business sector (BERD) and about 37.1 percent of public R&D was devoted to government 
intramural R&D activities (GOVERD). Figure 9 reveals a clear steady upward sloping trend for the share 
of government financed R&D that is devoted to higher education R&D and a falling trend for the other 
two components of public R&D over the last twenty years. In 2014, more than half of the public R&D 
budget (57.9 percent) was spent on R&D in the higher education sector, whereas intramural R&D and 
business R&D accounted for 30.5 and 11.6 percent, respectively.    
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Figure 9: Evolution of Public R&D Expenditures across Time, by Beneficiaries 
 
Note: Reported are the shares of government financed intramural R&D (GOVERD), government financed business R&D 
(BERD) and government financed higher education expenditure on R&D (HERD), in total public R&D (in %) 
5 Empirical Results 
This section provides econometric evidence related to our research questions how the business cycle 
impacts public investments in R&D and their components. Like the previous section, we structure the 
result section by first presenting evidence on how the business cycle impacts the level and growth of 
government financed R&D in section 5.1. Section 5.2 and 5.3 provide results on the question whether 
and how the business cycle affects the composition of government financed R&D with respect to 
thematic areas and to beneficiaries, respectively.  
5.1 Level and Growth of Government Financed R&D Expenditure  
In order to investigate the impact of the business cycle on government financed R&D expenditures in 
a multivariate analysis, we use model 1 as explained in section 3.2.  Table 1 and Table 2 report the 
results for GBAORD and PubRD  as dependent variable, respectively.  
We start by estimating a dynamic baseline model for the whole sample including lagged GDP and 
lagged SURPLUS as additional explanatory variable. The estimates reveal high and significant state 
dependence in government financed R&D expenditure. Even after accounting for unobserved country-
specific heterogeneity, the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable remains highly significant. The 
coefficient is always above 0.8 for GBAORD and it is even higher for PubRD . This implies that R&D 
spending of the government sector is changing only gradually.  
With respect to the impact of the business cycle, it turns out that lagged GDP is highly significant in 
the pooled OLS estimates (1) for both GBAORD and PubRD . This effect becomes even stronger when 
we additionally account for unobserved country heterogeneity in specification (2).  It turns out that 
this effect is very robust to the different specifications (3) to (12). For GBAORD , the elasticity varies 
between 0.144 and 0.209 based on system GMM results. This implies that an increase in GDP by 1 
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percent leads to a subsequent increase in GBAORD by roughly 0.15 to 0.2 percent on average. With 
a range of 0.079 to 0.172 this elasticity wrt to lagged GDP is slightly lower and somewhat less precisely 
estimated for PubRD . Overall, these findings corroborate a strong impact of business cycles on public 
R&D investments.  
As already explained in section 3.2, lagged SURPLUS accounts for government’s short-run financing 
conditions which may allow governments to pursue different R&D strategies but it is also highly 
correlated with the business cycle. Results show an impressively robust impact of SURPLUS on 
GBAORD . An estimated coefficient of about 0.006 to 0.008 implies that all things equal an increase 
in the surplus to GDP ratio by 1 percentage point (or a reduction in the deficit to GDP ratio by 1 
percentage point) increases GBAORD in the subsequent period by 0.6 to 0.8 percent. With an increase 
between 0.2 and 0.5 percent we find this effect again somewhat smaller and less precisely estimated 
for PubRD .  
In order to account for long-run financing conditions, lagged DEBT levels are introduced from 
specification (3) onwards which slightly reduces the sample size due to missing information for 2 
countries. Whereas specification (3) does not account for unobserved country heterogeneity, it is 
controlled for specifications (4) and (5) using System GMM. The latter two specifications differ in their 
assumption about the correlation between lagged GDP , SURPLUS as well as DEBT and the 
idiosyncratic error term. There is a trade-off between allowing these variables to be endogenous (or 
predetermined) and getting an extremely high number of instruments as result or restricting them to 
be strictly exogenous which is associated with a much smaller set of instruments. As a comparison of 
specification (4) and (5) shows the results to be rather robust, so that we therefore decided to use the 
strict exogeneity assumption throughout the following estimations. Instrument validity cannot be 
rejected for all estimates using both the Hansen test on overidentifying restrictions and the test on 
lack of second order autocorrelation (AR2) by Arellano and Bond (1991). Hence specification (5) is our 
benchmark specification. It turns out that lagged DEBT  is weakly significant in specification (5) and 
for most of the robustness checks. As expected, the coefficient is negative. This implies that increasing 
debt levels (in relation to GDP) forces governments to subsequently cut public R&D spending. 
According to the estimates, an increase in the debt to GDP ratio by 1 percentage point lowers on 
average both GBAORD  and PubRD  by 0.03 percent.  
Specifications (6) to (12) additionally account for business cycle effects by adding the 2-phases business 
cycle indicator RECESSION differentiating between recession and non-recession years. Compared to 
the quantitative GDP variable, the business cycle indicator performs much worse. RECESSION is not 
significant in any of the estimates for GBAORD and PubRD .  In order to see whether the effects of 
our main explanatory variables differ in recession and non-recession years we additionally incorporate 
interaction terms. This allows us to answer e.g. the question whether governments’ response to an 
increase (or decrease) in the budget surplus by 1 percentage point is different in a recession period 
compared to a non-recession period. Overall, there is not much evidence in favour of any interaction 
terms except for SURPLUS . Using the concurrent recession indicator, we find that an increase in the 
budget surplus by 1 percentage point raises GBAORD by roughly twice as much in recession periods 
(1.4 percent) compared to non-recession periods (0.6 percent). Long-term invest rates IR  which have 
been included to account for financing costs turn out to be insignificant throughout the estimates. 
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Table 1: Model 1: Impact of Business Cycle Indicators on Government R&D Expenditures (GBAORD) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Pooled   System   Pooled   System   System   System   System   Pooled   System   Pooled   System   System   
 OLS GMM OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM GMM 
VARIABLES    endog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. 
ln GBAORD (t-1) 0.920*** 0.869*** 0.910*** 0.889*** 0.830*** 0.993*** 0.815*** 0.914*** 0.801*** 0.913*** 0.823*** 0.809*** 
 (0.013) (0.051) (0.017) (0.118) (0.067) (0.022) (0.075) (0.017) (0.153) (0.017) (0.081) (0.067) 
ln GDP (t-1) 0.080*** 0.144** 0.092*** 0.170 0.181***  0.202** 0.087*** 0.223 0.088*** 0.201** 0.209*** 
 (0.014) (0.065) (0.020) (0.177) (0.064)  (0.079) (0.021) (0.160) (0.020) (0.087) (0.078) 
SURPLUS (t-1) 0.007*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.007** 0.005*** 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
DEBT (t-1)   -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0003* -0.000 -0.0004** -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0002* -0.0004* -0.000 
   (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0002) (0.000) (0.0002) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.000) 
IR (t)   -0.002 -0.000 -0.004 0.001 -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
   (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) (0.007) (0.004) 
RECESSION (t-1)      -0.018 0.002 -0.111 0.089 -0.054 -0.018 0.100* 
      (0.024) (0.015) (0.154) (2.241) (0.034) (0.044) (0.058) 
ln GDP x RECESSION (t-1)        0.005 -0.007    
        (0.012) (0.170)    
SURPLUS x RECESSION (t-1)        0.000 -0.002 0.001 -0.003 0.008* 
        (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
DEBT x RECESSION (t-1)        0.0003* 0.0001 0.0004** 0.0001 -0.001 
        (0.0002) (0.002) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.001) 
IR x RECESSION (t-1)        -0.000 -0.003    
        (0.005) (0.031)    
Constant -0.358*** -0.784* -0.421*** -1.258 -0.934*** 0.106 -1.091** -0.385*** -1.254 -0.391*** -1.143* -1.147** 
 (0.093) (0.464) (0.127) (1.391) (0.325) (0.184) (0.455) (0.127) (1.031) (0.126) (0.633) (0.554) 
R-squared 0.997  0.997     0.997  0.997   
J . 23.897 . 18.634 18.777 21.386 18.169 . 16.477 . 16.827 15.997 
J (p-value) . 1.000  1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 1.000 
AR1 (p-value) . 0.004 . 0.010 0.010 0.007 0.010  0.018 . 0.009 0.007 
AR2 (p-value) . 0.116 . 0.187 0.185 0.178 0.187 . 0.259  0.175 0.200 
Observations 474 474 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 412 
No. countries 26 26 24  24 24 24 24  24 24  24 24 24 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses for pooled OLS and Windmijer finite-sample corrected standard errors for System GMM. Estonia and South Korea 
are dropped due to missing information from estimation (3) onwards. (12) uses current recession indicator. 
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Table 2: Model 1: Impact of Business Cycle Indicators on Government R&D Expenditures (PubRD) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
 Pooled   System   Pooled   System   System   System   System   Pooled   System   Pooled   System   System   
 OLS GMM OLS GMM GMM GMM GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM GMM 
VARIABLES    endog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. exog. 
ln GBAORD (t-1) 0.927*** 0.928*** 0.918*** 0.985*** 0.891*** 1.006*** 0.890*** 0.919*** 0.850*** 0.920*** 0.961*** 0.639*** 
 (0.011) (0.030) (0.011) (0.066) (0.049) (0.027) (0.056) (0.011) (0.123) (0.011) (0.073) (0.182) 
ln GDP (t-1) 0.072*** 0.079** 0.081*** 0.029 0.112**  0.113** 0.080*** 0.172 0.079*** 0.068 0.415* 
 (0.013) (0.034) (0.011) (0.077) (0.048)  (0.056) (0.011) (0.125) (0.012) (0.070) (0.241) 
SURPLUS (t-1) 0.006*** 0.005*** 0.004*** 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.004*** 0.002 0.004*** 0.003* 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
DEBT (t-1)   -0.0001 -0.001 -0.0003* -0.001 -0.000* -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000* -0.000*** -0.000 
   (0.0001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
IR (t)   -0.004** -0.003 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.005** -0.007 -0.004** 0.004 -0.005 
   (0.002) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.002) (0.011) (0.002) (0.008) (0.007) 
RECESSION (t-1)      -0.013 0.002 -0.015 -1.158 -0.028 -0.035 -0.049 
      (0.016) (0.020) (0.137) (0.781) (0.036) (0.051) (0.083) 
ln GDP x RECESSION (t-1)        -0.002 0.081    
        (0.011) (0.059)    
SURPLUS x RECESSION (t-1)        0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.002 0.001 
        (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
DEBT x RECESSION (t-1)        0.000 -0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
        (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
IR x RECESSION (t-1)        0.003 0.018    
        (0.004) (0.015)    
Constant -0.310*** -0.398 -0.324*** -0.158 -0.490* 0.104 -0.493 -0.308*** -0.958 -0.308*** -0.536 -2.450 
 (0.081) (0.280) (0.071) (0.680) (0.268) (0.187) (0.316) (0.068) (0.675) (0.073) (0.427) (1.719) 
R-squared 0.999  0.999     0.999  0.999   
J . 20.980 . 16.542 15.193 14.541 15.199 . 7.805 . 10.876 10.866 
p-value . 1.000 . 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 1.000 
AR1 (p-value) . 0.007 . 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 . 0.000 . 0.001 0.060 
AR2 (p-value) . 0.942 . 0.771 0.826 0.851 0.839 . 0.221 . 0.782 0.771 
Observations 354 354 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 
No. of countries 23 23 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Clustered standard errors in parentheses for pooled OLS and Windmijer finite-sample corrected standard errors for System GMM. Estonia and South Korea 
are dropped due to missing information from estimation (3) onwards.
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Table A.1 in the Appendix presents some additional robustness checks for model 1 using the 4-phases 
business cycle indicators BOOM , DOWNTURN and RECESSION and the GDP growth rate as 
explanatory variables for business cycle variations. Again, it turns out that these indicators perform 
worth in the estimation while the results on the other variables are rather robust to this change in 
specification. Finally, Table A.1 also includes dummy indicators for innovation followers, moderate 
innovators and non-EU countries (with innovation leaders being the reference group). None of these 
country group dummies indicating innovation performance turns out to be significant for the level of 
R&D expenditure financed by the government sector.   
Instead of using the level of government financed R&D, model 2 uses the corresponding growth rate 
as dependent variable (see section 3.2). Table 3 reports the estimation results for both GRGBAORD  
and GRPubRD . Results for SURPLUS  and DEBT  are pretty much in line with the results for model 
1. The coefficient of SURPLUS  is highly significant and indicates that an increase in the budget surplus 
in relation to GDP by 1 percentage point stimulates growth of GBAORD  by 0.6 to 0.8 percentage 
points. With an increase between 0.4 and 0.5 percentage points this effect is again somewhat smaller 
and less precisely estimated for PubRD . The effect of DEBT  is also in a similar range but less 
significant than in model 1. In contrast to the results for model 1, we do not find a significant effect of 
the GDP growth rate. Instead we find the RECESSION indicator significant in most of the estimates 
for GRGBAORD and partly also for GRPubRD . On average, the growth of GBAORD is 2.5 percentage 
points lower in recessions than in non-recession periods. Most interestingly, we corroborate the 
descriptive finding that European innovation leaders follow a counter-cyclical behaviour also in the 
multivariate analysis. All others things equal, growth of GBAORD is about 2.876 percentage points 
higher in recession periods than in non-recession periods for innovation leaders. As there is no 
significant difference with respect to non-EU countries, we can conclude that counter-cyclicality also 
holds for them. In contrast, we find pro-cyclicality for innovation followers and moderate innovators. 
For both country groups the interaction term with RECESSION is highly significant. Based on the 
estimates, growth of GBAORD is about 1.706 and 8.575 percentage points lower for innovation 
followers and moderate innovators, respectively.  Results for public R&D expenditures ( PubRD ) are 
somewhat weaker but they also confirm counter-cyclical behaviour for innovation leaders and pro-
cyclicality for moderate innovators. 
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Table 3: Model 2: Impact of Business Cycle Indicators on the Growth of Government R&D Expenditures (GBAORD and PubRD) 










 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
GRGDP (t-1) -0.459   -0.258 -0.226 0.316*   0.097 0.182 
 (0.404)   (0.214) (0.219) (0.182)   (0.129) (0.123) 
SURPLUS (t-1) 0.655*** 0.745*** 0.732*** 0.693*** 0.802*** 0.447** 0.531*** 0.534*** 0.410** 0.461** 
 (0.155) (0.135) (0.130) (0.145) (0.162) (0.196) (0.166) (0.173) (0.158) (0.170) 
DEBT (t-1) -0.024 -0.049** -0.046** -0.050** -0.035* 0.006 -0.031 -0.033 -0.032 -0.026 
 (0.022) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.019) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
IR (t) -0.605* 0.239 0.233 0.421* 0.456** -1.036*** -0.525** -0.517** -0.419** -0.481** 
 (0.308) (0.178) (0.171) (0.220) (0.175) (0.309) (0.202) (0.201) (0.184) (0.178) 
BOOM (t-1)  -1.929*     -0.121    
  (1.065)     (0.775)    
DOWNTURN (t-1)  -1.452     1.208*    
  (0.966)     (0.602)    
RECESSION (t-1)  -3.420** -2.521* -0.444 2.876**  -0.482 -1.076 0.161 1.716** 
  (1.506) (1.434) (3.954) (1.161)  (1.015) (0.975) (2.072) (0.773) 
GRGDP x RECESSION (t-1)    0.136     0.444  
    (0.650)     (0.258)  
SURPLUS x RECESSION (t-1)    0.919     0.478*  
    (0.550)     (0.244)  
DEBT x RECESSION (t-1)    0.013     -0.002  
    (0.025)     (0.014)  
RECESSION (t-1) x FOLLOWER     -4.582**     -1.020 
     (2.039)     (1.196) 
RECESSION (t-1) x MODERATE     -11.451***     -4.845** 
     (2.156)     (2.133) 
RECESSION (t-1) x NON-EU     0.010     -1.553 
     (2.636)     (1.194) 
Constant 7.293*** 9.378*** 8.188*** 8.827*** 7.595*** -0.138 9.740*** 10.470*** 9.151*** 8.634*** 
 (2.201) (1.296) (1.499) (2.098) (1.654) (2.608) (1.736) (1.796) (2.123) (2.104) 
Time Dummies Yes No No No No Yes No No No No 
R-squared 0.145 0.105 0.099 0.118 0.122 0.214 0.144 0.136 0.161 0.149 
rho 0.171 0.150 0.149 0.172 0.162 0.428 0.291 0.290 0.370 0.322 
Observations 412 412 412 412 412 286 286 286 286 286 
Number of countries 24 24 24 24 24 21 21 21 21 21 
Notes: Fixed effects (FE) estimates. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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5.2 Government Appropriations and Outlays for R&D (GBAORD) by Thematic Areas 
Table 4 presents the estimation results of the fixed effects specification for the seven components of 
GBAORD and for total civil R&D (i.e. total GBAORD minus defence R&D outlays). As main explanatory 
variables we include the lagged growth rate of GDP, the lagged to budget surplus to GDP ratio and the 
ratio of total non-R&D government expenditure to GDP. Columns 1 and 2 represent estimates of the 
shares of defence and total civil spending in total GBAORD. Columns 3 through 8 present estimates of 
the share of the components of civil spending as a share of total civil GBAORD. Note that specifications 
1 and 2 do not include data from Israel, for which no defence spending was available, and that 
specification 8 does not include data from South Korea, for which no university funds spending was 
reported. 
Neither defence-related GBAORD nor GBAORD assigned to civil topics vary systematically along GDP 
growth, public surplus, or general government expenditures. This holds for the components of civil 
GBAORD too. Even though column 5 shows a positive relation between education and social GBAORD 
and public surplus, and column 6 shows a negative relation between GDP growth and space-related 
GBAORD, both effects are small (less than one percentage point). The latter relation is also not 
supported by the results of the dynamic panel specification (see Appendix). The effect of public surplus 
on education and social research is supported by the dynamic panel specification, though the 
coefficient shrinks to 0.4% in that specification.  
Next we turn to the differences in the composition of GBAORD during recession years. Table 5 presents 
the estimation results. While Figure 2 showed some differences in the composition of GBAORD during 
recession years, these largely fade when controlling for GDP growth, public surplus, and other 
government expenditures. The coefficient of the recession indicator is estimated at 1.5 percentage 
points at most, and is statistically insignificant from zero across all categories at p>0.10.  Thus, the 
composition of GBAORD is not significantly affected by recessions.  
The models in Table 5 also include an interaction between the recession indicator and public surplus.7 
This accounts for the possibility that during a recession, some categories of GBAORD are funded with 
priority when more money becomes available. The nonsignificant and small coefficients – on the order 
of one percentage point or less – show that this is largely not the case. Only the coefficient of R&D 
outlays for economic development is weakly statistically significant (p<0.10), and leads to the 
interpretation that during a recession, a one percentage point increase in the public surplus to GDP 
ratio leads to a 0.28 percentage point more increase in economic development R&D outlays than 




7 The results discussed above remain robust to omitting this interaction from the model.  
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Table 4: Model 3: FE regression of composition of GBAORD: base specification 
  (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES Defence Civil GBAORD  Economic Development Health & Environment Education & Social Space Non-oriented University Funds 
GRGDP (t-1) -0.127 0.127  0.295 -0.037 -0.201 -0.085** 0.094 -0.093 
(0.151) (0.151)  (0.210) (0.105) (0.143) (0.038) (0.262) (0.122) 
SURPLUS (t-1) -0.037 0.037  0.056 -0.103 0.181** 0.048 -0.239 0.063 
(0.092) (0.092)  (0.117) (0.093) (0.068) (0.053) (0.188) (0.121) 
GOVEXP (t) -0.231 0.231  0.022 -0.007 0.121 -0.040 0.109 -0.215 
(0.165) (0.165)  (0.170) (0.106) (0.129) (0.033) (0.209) (0.131) 
Constant 20.085** 79.915***  25.242*** 11.724** 1.114 7.455*** 12.195 43.147*** 
(8.518) (8.518)  (8.055) (5.320) (5.502) (1.976) (9.974) (6.188) 
Observations 435 435  453 453 451 452 452 437 
R-squared 0.160 0.160  0.120 0.152 0.079 0.179 0.051 0.064 
Number of countries 26 26  27 27 27 27 27 26 
sigma 18.358 18.358  18.358 18.358 18.358 18.358 18.358 18.358 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * < p 0.1. The dependent variables are the components of GBAORD as percentage of Total GBAORD for 
Defence and Civil GBAORD, and as a percentage of Civil GBAORD for the rest. Data: 1995-2015. 
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Table 5: Model 3: FE regression of composition of GBAORD: interaction with recession indicator 
  (1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
VARIABLES 
Defence Civil GBAORD  Economic Development Health & Environment Education & Social Space Non-oriented University Funds 
GRGDP (t-1) -0.163 0.163  0.267 -0.038 -0.132 -0.092** 0.083 -0.097 
(0.126) (0.126)  (0.226) (0.119) (0.116) (0.037) (0.301) (0.127) 
RECESSION -0.464 0.464  0.941 1.005 -0.307 -0.518 -1.147 0.448 
(0.696) (0.696)  (1.218) (0.837) (1.412) (0.366) (1.893) (1.318) 
SURPLUS (t-1)) -0.040 0.040  0.028 -0.122 0.210** 0.056 -0.221 0.053 
(0.095) (0.095)  (0.113) (0.104) (0.097) (0.053) (0.196) (0.134) 
RECESSION x  
SURPLUS (t-1)  
0.089 -0.089  0.275* 0.161 -0.365 -0.049 -0.128 0.084 
(0.185) (0.185)  (0.145) (0.139) (0.236) (0.046) (0.247) (0.131) 
GOVEXP (t) -0.209 0.209  0.041 -0.003 0.079 -0.038 0.111 -0.212 
(0.173) (0.173)  (0.183) (0.104) (0.146) (0.033) (0.204) (0.136) 
Constant 19.381*
* 
80.619***  24.483*** 11.493** 2.564 7.427**
* 
12.219 43.016*** 
(8.882) (8.882)  (8.594) (5.260) (6.239) (1.962) (9.840) (6.320) 
Observations 
435 435  453 453 451 452 452 437 
R-squared 
0.163 0.163  0.126 0.156 0.104 0.183 0.052 0.064 
Number of countries 
26 26  27 27 27 27 27 26 
sigma 
18.358 18.358  18.358 18.358 18.358 18.358 18.358 18.358 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * < p 0.1. The dependent variables are the components of GBAORD as percentage of Total GBAORD for 
Defence and Civil GBAORD, and as a percentage of Civil GBAORD for the rest. Data: 1995-2015. 
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Table 6 : Share of GBAORD assigned to civil purposes, by EU membership and Innovation Union Scoreboard class 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable:  
% of GBAORD for civil purposes 
EU Non-EU  Innovation Leader Innovation Follower Moderate Innovator 
GRGDP (t-1) 0.230 -0.027  -0.003 0.010 0.115* 
 (0.139) (0.156)  (0.271) (0.097) (0.058) 
RECESSION 0.407 -1.764  2.942 0.599 2.045 
 (0.835) (0.889)  (4.834) (0.942) (3.001) 
SURPLUS (t-1) -0.020 0.335*  -0.402 0.092 -0.211 
 (0.112) (0.131)  (0.430) (0.144) (0.174) 
RECESSION x SURPLUS (t-1)) -0.025 -0.415*  0.192 -0.198 0.144 
 (0.191) (0.153)  (0.424) (0.254) (0.416) 
GOVEXP (t 0.249 -0.321*  -0.730** 0.046 0.079 
 (0.179) (0.107)  (0.170) (0.157) (0.215) 
Constant 79.440*** 94.306***  131.618*** 88.944*** 88.195*** 
 (9.769) (4.193)  (10.050) (6.654) (10.212) 
Observations 364 71  75 289 118 
R-squared 0.197 0.632  0.450 0.141 0.264 
Number of countries 22 4  4 18 8 
sigma 6.034 6.034  6.034 6.034 6.034 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. The dependent variables are the share of civil GBAORD as percentage of Total GBAORD Year 




Table 6 presents split sample estimates for EU versus non-EU countries (column 1-2), and EU countries 
according to their innovation status according to the Innovation Union Scoreboard (column 3-5). 
Regarding the first group, we find in non-EU countries a weakly significant positive relation between 
public surplus and civil GBAORD: a one percentage point increase in public surplus (or reduction in 
public deficit) as share of GDP relates to a 0.3 percentage point increase in the share of GBAORD 
allocated to civil purposes (p<0.10). However, during recessions the relation reverses and an increase 
in government surplus is disproportionately allocated to defence GBAORD (p<0.10). The splits based 
on innovation status show no large differences in countries’ response to recessions. However, it is 
interesting to note that among moderate innovators, the relation between the share of GBAORD 
allocated to civil purposes is significantly dependent on GDP growth (p<0.10), while this is not the case 
among innovation leaders or innovation followers. 
5.3 Public R&D Expenditures by Beneficiaries 
This last subsection is aimed at answering whether governments redistribute public R&D expenditures 
during economic crises across different beneficiaries. Table 7 presents estimation results for 
government financed R&D in the business sector, government sector and higher education sector 
using model 4 (see section 3.2).  
A clear pattern emerges from these different regressions: First, there is very high true state 
dependence in the shares of public R&D expenditures by beneficiaries. Persistence is particularly high 
for government financed R&D in the higher education sector with a coefficient of the lagged 
dependent variable of 0.99 and higher. For specification (2) the estimate is even slightly above 1 
reflecting the steady increase in this share over the period 1995 to 2014. State dependence is only 
slightly lower for intramural R&D activities with a coefficient of the lagged dependent variable of 0.95 
and higher. These high values are not surprising given the fact that public R&D is mainly devoted to 
financing researchers in the government and higher education sector. Persistence is somewhat lower 
for government support for R&D in the business sector but still high. 
Second, there is hardly any evidence for redistributing public R&D expenditures across beneficiaries 
which can be traced back to the business cycle. None of the variables capturing business cycle effects 
turned out to be significant. The change in the evolution of the corresponding shares over time (see 
Figure 9), showing an increasing long-run trend for public R&D expenditures in the higher education 





Table 7: Model 4: Impact of Business Cycle on Public R&D Investment by Beneficiaries  
  Business R&D financed by Gov (BPubRD) Gov. intramural R&D financed by Gov (GVPubRD) Higher Education R&D financed by Gov (HPubRD) 
 Pooled  System Pooled  System Pooled  System Pooled  System Pooled  System Pooled  System 
 OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM OLS GMM 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
B/GV/HPubRD (t-1) 0.950*** 0.898*** 0.948*** 0.835*** 0.969*** 0.953*** 0.967*** 0.985*** 0.992*** 1.078*** 0.990*** 0.804*** 
 (0.025) (0.071) (0.028) (0.134) (0.009) (0.045) (0.009) (0.125) (0.010) (0.240) (0.010) (0.245) 
ln GDP (t-1) -0.156 0.156 -0.099 0.302 0.147 0.043 0.117 0.000 0.112 -2.791 0.093 3.993 
 (0.112) (0.261) (0.108) (0.493) (0.087) (0.098) (0.101) (0.000) (0.116) (6.273) (0.128) (3.312) 
SURPLUS (t-1) -0.027 -0.034 -0.041 -0.057 -0.004 0.008 -0.004 -0.036 0.014 0.071 0.024 -0.050 
 (0.041) (0.069) (0.038) (0.056) (0.023) (0.037) (0.025) (0.207) (0.046) (0.076) (0.054) (0.163) 
DEBT (t-1) -0.001 -0.005 -0.001 -0.009 0.002 0.004 0.000 0.000 -0.006 0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.021) (0.005) (0.012) (0.006) (0.016) 
IR (t) 0.051 0.126 0.037 0.113 -0.018 0.060 -0.003 0.002 -0.006 -0.024 -0.005 -0.181 
 (0.073) (0.103) (0.073) (0.082) (0.073) (0.158) (0.067) (0.672) (0.055) (0.142) (0.058) (0.275) 
RECESSION (t-1)   7.980* 9.709   -4.853* 0.000   -2.487 -12.322 
   (3.890) (11.778)   (2.775) (0.000)   (2.687) (50.959) 
ln GDP x RECESSION (t-1)   -0.541* -0.675   0.316 -0.112   0.177 0.990 
   (0.293) (0.875)   (0.219) (0.148)   (0.226) (3.954) 
SURPLUS x RECESSION (t-1)   0.143 0.107   -0.013 0.365   -0.104 -0.116 
   (0.085) (0.102)   (0.067) (1.083)   (0.065) (0.598) 
DEBT x RECESSION (t-1)   0.004 -0.005   0.006 0.029   -0.009 -0.027 
   (0.009) (0.015)   (0.010) (0.048)   (0.010) (0.073) 
Constant 2.471* -1.283 1.747 -2.309 -1.598 0.000 -1.060 0.000 -0.072 34.677 0.188 -42.098 
 (1.369) (3.501) (1.146) (6.998) (1.103) (0.000) (1.339) (0.000) (1.768) (74.968) (1.801) (31.368) 
R-squared 0.906  0.908  0.966  0.966  0.972  0.972  
J . 11.294 . 8.579 . 17.656 . 16.052 . 16.763 . 11.745 
p-value . 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 . 1.000 
AR1 (p-value) . 0.012 . 0.018 . 0.005 . 0.016 . 0.015 . 0.027 
AR2 (p-value) . 0.265 . 0.254 . 0.156 . 0.157 . 0.432 . 0.803 
Observations 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 286 
No. of countries 21  21  21 21 21  21  21 21  21 21  21 21 






Recently, a growing number of papers have studied the impact of the 2008/2009 financial and 
economic crisis on firms’ R&D activities. This paper takes a different approach by studying the impact 
of economic crises on government financed R&D activities for a sample of 26 OECD countries over the 
period 1995 to 2015. In particular, we addressed three different research questions: First, do economic 
crises influence the overall level and growth of public R&D expenditures? Second, do economic crises 
lead to any shifts in the composition of public R&D expenditures across different thematic areas? And 
third, are there any business cycle induced redistributions across different beneficiaries of public R&D 
expenditure. Our analysis makes use of two different measures for government financed R&D: 
GBAORD and public R&D expenditures calculated using different components of gross domestic 
expenditures on R&D. 
We observe a high persistence in government financed R&D activities which means that public R&D 
spending only change gradually. But in addition our results demonstrate that there is strong pro-
cyclical effect on public R&D investments. An increase in GDP by 1 percent leads to a subsequent 
increase for instance in GBAORD by roughly 0.15 to 0.2 percent. The econometric results furthermore 
show that the growth rate of GBAORD is on average 2.5 percentage points lower in a recession than in 
a non-recession. There is, however, impressive evidence that countries react differently to recessions. 
In particular, European innovation leaders pursue a counter-cyclical strategy and increase growth of 
GBOARD during a recession. A similar though somewhat less pronounced counter-cyclical strategy is 
shown for the non-EU countries considered in this study (Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, South Korea 
and the US). In contrast, innovation followers and moderate innovators clearly follow a pro-cyclical 
pattern. That is, they cut public R&D expenditures significantly during recessions. As a result, we have 
observed an increasing innovation gap between innovation leaders and moderate innovators in Europe 
due to the most recent 2008 crisis. As innovation is a major driver of productivity and growth, this 
increased innovation gap might lead to stronger productivity differences across these different country 
groups in the long-run.  
Our results furthermore show that governments’ short-run and long-run financing conditions affect 
public R&D spending significantly. A loosening of budget constraints allows governments to intensify 
their R&D strategy and finance more R&D activities, either in the government sector or in the higher 
education and business sector. As a result, we observe that an increase in the surplus to GDP ratio (or 
a reduction in the deficit to GDP ratio) by 1 percentage point, stimulates GBAORD by 0.6 to 0.8 percent 
in the short-run. But governments face a trade-off when using an increase in budget surplus for 
additional spending. Alternatively, they could have used it to repay debts. Increasing government debt 
levels on the contrary have led to reductions in public R&D spending in the period under consideration. 
High levels of debt exert a strong pressure to consolidate public budgets so that spending for R&D is 
likely to be cut as well. The pressure to reduce public debt levels is currently observed in most 
European countries so that R&D budgets are likely to contribute to fiscal consolidation in the future. 
Concerning the second research question, our analysis does not support the hypothesis that economic 
crises systematically affect the composition of GBAORD spending along 7 thematic areas. That is, 
differences in the level of GBAORD seem to proportionally reduce spending in each category, and do 
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not lead to some areas being cut disproportionally. Rather, the composition of GBAORD seems to be 
subject to longer-run trends. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn for the third research question concerning the composition of public 
R&D expenditures by beneficiaries. Our analysis does not provide any evidence for a business cycle 
induced redistribution of public R&D expenditures across beneficiaries. The observed long-run shift 
towards financing disproportionally more R&D in the higher education sector compared to R&D in the 
business and government sector is subject to a shift in governments’ strategy but not related to any 
business cycle effects.  
In a nutshell, our results corroborate that the recent 2008/2009 financial and economic crisis and the 
sluggish recovery in many countries states had a severe and still lasting impact on the ability of 
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Figure A.1: GBAORD and Public R&D Expenditure in % of GDP by Country, 1995-2015 
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Table A.1: Model 1 – Robustness Checks 
  4-phase BC indicator 2-phase BC indicator GDP growth EIS country groups  
 GBAORD PubRD GBAORD PubRD GBAORD PubRD GBAORD PubRD GBAORD PubRD 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
ln GBAORD (t-1) 0.994*** 1.009*** 0.996*** 1.002*** 0.994*** 0.987*** 0.708*** 0.942*** 0.807*** 0.783** 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.024) (0.033) (0.020) (0.037) (0.177) (0.249) (0.231) (0.376) 
ln GDP (t-1)       0.328 0.032 0.226 0.241 
       (0.200) (0.294) (0.263) (0.423) 
SURPLUS (t-1) 0.004*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.002 0.006*** 0.003 0.004** 0.002 0.007* 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.004) (0.003) 
DEBT (t-1) -0.001 -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) 
IR (t) -0.003 -0.011** 0.000 -0.008 0.002 -0.005 -0.002 -0.010 0.000 -0.005 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.006) (0.008) 
BOOM (t-1) 0.013 0.009         
 (0.017) (0.023)         
DOWNTURN (t-1) 0.020** -0.003         
 (0.009) (0.008)         
RECESSION (t-1) -0.010 -0.005     0.009 -0.005 -0.152 0.043 
 (0.018) (0.018)     (0.021) (0.026) (0.293) (0.283) 
DOWN (t-1)   0.018** 0.001       
   (0.008) (0.007)       
GRGDP (t-1)     -0.001 0.001     
     (0.002) (0.002)     
Innov. Follower       -0.081 0.100 -0.048 0.063 
       (0.083) (0.297) (0.103) (0.429) 
Moderate       -0.129 0.101 -0.066 0.099 
       (0.129) (0.342) (0.149) (0.491) 
Non-EU       -0.118 0.253 -0.080 0.063 
       (0.104) (0.497) (0.115) (0.659) 
RECESS x  Follower        0.238 -0.068 
         (0.345) (0.162) 
RECES x Moderate        0.165 -0.117 
         (0.373) (0.155) 
RECES x Non-EU        0.201 0.052 
         (0.379) (0.062) 
Constant 0.142 0.110 0.074 0.126 0.108 0.177 -1.810 0.111 -1.316 -1.386 
 (0.214) (0.197) (0.205) (0.221) (0.140) (0.245) (1.164) (1.862) (1.620) (2.352) 
J (p-value) 1.000 0.002 1.000 0.904 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 
AR1 (p-value) 0.007 0.999 0.006 0.002 0.006 0.001 0.023 0.027 0.024 0.113 
AR2 (p-value) 0.198 1.000 0.208 1.000 0.187 0.806 0.195 0.909 0.171 0.756 
Observations 412 286 412 286 412 286 412 286 412 286 
Notes: All estimates are based on System GMM. Windmijer finite-sample corrected standard errors.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  
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Table A.2: Dynamic panel estimates of composition of GBAORD 










Space Non-oriented University Funds 
Dependent (t-1) 0.971*** 0.972***  0.783*** 0.893*** 0.889*** 0.962*** 0.860*** 0.857*** 
 (0.022) (0.039)  (0.128) (0.068) (0.014) (0.008) (0.069) (0.049) 
GRGDP (t-1) 0.023 -0.023  0.067 -0.049 0.012 -0.000 0.013 0.018 
(0.018) (0.019)  (0.065) (0.054) (0.023) (0.010) (0.081) (0.052) 
SURPLUS (t-1) -0.020 0.031  0.112 -0.004 0.040** -0.025* -0.020 -0.026 
(0.023) (0.038)  (0.097) (0.029) (0.016) (0.014) (0.047) (0.081) 
GOVEXP (t) -0.015 0.020  -0.024 -0.075 0.003 -0.004 -0.013 0.141 
(0.011) (0.029)  (0.115) (0.048) (0.020) (0.005) (0.073) (0.087) 
Constant 0.563 2.085  6.317 5.018* 0.514 0.188 3.299 -2.595 
(0.520) (3.492)  (7.447) (2.603) (0.828) (0.238) (3.172) (3.835) 
          
Observations 417 417  435 435 433 435 435 420 
Number of countries 25 25  26 26 26 26 26 25 
J 17.894 17.894  17.894 17.894 17.894 17.894 17.894 17.894 
p-value 1.000 0.001  1.000 1.000 1.000 0.001 0.117 0.117 
AR1 -3.194 -3.194  -3.194 -3.194 -3.194 -3.194 -3.194 -3.194 
p-value 0.001 0.117  0.001 0.001 0.001 0.117 1.000 0.001 
AR2 -1.567 -1.567  -1.567 -1.567 -1.567 -1.567 -1.567 -1.567 
p-value 0.117 1.000  0.117 0.117 0.117 1.000 0.001 1.000 
sigma 3.175 3.175  3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 3.175 
Notes: Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01, ** p <0.05, * < p 0.1. The dependent variables are the components of GBAORD as percentage of Total GBAORD 
for Defence and Civil GBAORD, and as a percentage of Civil GBAORD for the rest. Estimation since year 1996 (same as GBAORD estimations). Independent variables are assumed exogenous.  
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